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I. INTRODUCTION
Transnational human rights litigation has succeeded at a steady
pace since the Second Circuit's 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.' In
Filartiga, the court construed an eighteenth century statute - the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 2 - as granting both a cause of action and
jurisdiction to two Paraguayan citizens.3 The ATCA provides: "[D]istrict
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States."' Accordingly, the Second Circuit permitted the Filartigas
to file suit against a Paraguayan official for violating the customary
* M.A., Yale University, 1998; J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 1999, Ph.D. candidate,
Yale University, 2000. I owe many thanks to David S. Bedeerman, Drew S. Days, III, Paul
Dubinsky, Robert D. Harrison, Derek P. Jinks, Harold Hongju Koh, Ruti Teitel, and Beth Van
Schaack. This Article is dedicated to Jennifer Morrow.
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
3. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
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international law against torture since the official had allegedly tortured to
death Dr. Filartiga's seventeen year-old son. Over the years, the Filartiga
ruling has achieved a strong following in several other circuits.,
Notably, the Filartiga line of cases was temporarily disturbed by a
contrary District of Columbia Circuit decision Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic.6  Congress effectively overturned that case by passing the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)., The TVPA contadicts Judge
Bork's position in Tel Oren that the ATCA could not establish a cause of
action for modem customary international law.8 The Statute enumerated
two specific causes of action, torture and extrajudicial killing, leaving the
remainder of the ATCA intact. Now several years after the TVPA,
Section 1350 case law has continued to develop; with more circuits
following the Filartiga decision and other causes of action being deemed
appropriate for litigation.9In this discussion, I analyze the TVPA and its legislative history to
demonstrate the scope and consequence of Congress' endorsement of
human rights litigation. This endeavor is undertaken primarily in response
to an emergent challenge to transnational human rights litigation. That is,
a handful of scholars have recently argued that the consensus view on
international law includes an ill-founded maxim that customary
international law is federal common law.1o This critique, which has been
called the revisionist position, potentially disrupts ATCA litigation.
Specifically, if customary international law is not federal common law, the
federal judiciary arguably could not elaborate other causes of action
without specific political branch authorization.
5. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
7. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 78, codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995) (genocide); Doe v. Unocal,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5094, 32-35 (March 25, 1997) (slave trade).
10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. (1997); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weisburd, State Courts]; Arthur
M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Cf.
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665
(1986).
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Indeed, revisionists argue that customary international law should
not be federal law without a prior political branch sanction due, in large
part, to democratic accountability and separation-of-power concerns. In
response, I take the position that the TVPA blunts the force of this
criticism. In particular, the statute's text and legislative history
demonstrate: that passage of the TVPA provides ample political branch
authorization for the wider Filartiga doctrine if such authorization was
indeed necessary; and that the TVPA legislative history indicates
Congressional agreement with the conventional view that customary
international law is federal common law absent political branch action."
The TVPA, thus, both immunizes the, Filartiga doctrine from the
revisionist challenge, and brings into question the merits of the revisionist
position itself.
II. READING THE TVPA: CHOOSING AN INTERPRETIVE METHOD
My discussion primarily relates to aspects of the revisionist
critique presented by Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, since
their work both explicitly challenges Filartiga and also attempts to account
for the TVPA. Notably, Bradley and Goldsmith's argument has evolved;
that is, their position has increasingly hardened in response to their critics.
Initially, they presented their argument that political branch authorization is
necessary for federal courts to apply customary international law as federal
law, but gave no indication of rules that would define such an authoritative
signal. Derek Jinks and I argued that if such a political branch signal were
necessary, it has been given: Congress, in passing the TVPA, endorsed
the Filartiga line of cases.12
In rebuttal to our TVPA argument, Bradley and Goldsmith moved
from an earlier, cursory discussion of the statute" to recognizing that the
11. The present discussion directly builds on earlier work. See Ryan Goodman & Derek
P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (Nov. 1997). This work should be consulted for its more encompassing
analysis of the revisionist position within the context of the Filartiga doctrine. For other
extensive criticisms of the revisionist position, see Derek P. Jinks, The Federal Common Law of
Universal, Obligatory, and Definable Human Rights Norms, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(forthcoming 1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM. L. REV.
371 (Nov. 1997); and Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land Customary International Law as
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (Nov. 1997).
12. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 11.
13. Indeed, the initial revisionist position only briefly mentioned the statute for the limited
claim that the TVPA "[bly creating a federal cause of action for torture ... arguably provides a
basis for federal question jurisdiction for suits involving torture." Bradley & Goldsmith,
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TVPA definitely creates a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial
killing. However, they claim that the TVPA should be read, first, as
failing to endorse the Filartiga line of casesand, second, as a
Congressional rejection of Filartiga's open-ended approach. The TVPA,
they argue, should be construed to limit Section 1350 suits to only the
enumerated causes of action, torture and extrajudicial killing. They
conclude: that if Congress intended to sanction the federal courts' view
that other causes of action are permitted under Section 1350, the text of the
statute would have to stipulate such an endorsement explicitly. In short,
this most recent articulation of their position effectively denies the very
possibility of federal common law; since the Congress must specify by the
full extent of the judiciary's interpretive domain.
Indeed, to avoid the TVPA destructive implications for the
revisionist position, Bradley and Goldsmith implicitly now appear to
embrace Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
Conspicuously, Bradley and Goldsmith eschew discussion of any details of
the legislative history. Instead, they perform a series of exercises that
accord with the textualist approach: comparing the purposes of analogous
statutes and making inferences from the structure of the statute as a whole.
Most importantly, their suggested requirement of a clear textual statement
closely accords with the central "radical" 1 principles of Justice Scalia's
textualism. Ultimately, their approach departs from established
conventions not only of international law but also of statutory
interpretation.
In contrast to Bradley and Goldsmith's approach, I interpret the
meaning and purpose of Section 1350 and the TVPA by including a close
examination of the TVPA legislative history. The judiciary's general
method of statutory interpretation encourages this use of legislative
history." And, my assessment of the TVPA, in particular, relies on the
Customary International Law, supra note 10, at 873 n.356 (citing Weisburd, State Courts, supra
note 10, at 3-4); see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 10, at 56 ("Congress can enact
statutes creating federal causes of action for violations of international law, as it has done with
respect to torture, for example.") This brief aside offered no indication of either the deep
interconnections between the TVPA and Section 1350, or the extensive legislative history
concerning congressional support of the Filartiga doctrine. Furthermore, claiming the TVPA
arguably provides a cause of action for torture is unnecessarily ambiguous; and discussing the
statutes application only to torture - when the body of the statute also deals extensively with
extrajudicial killings - suggests a surface reading of simply the statute's title.
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990).
15. In 1983, Judge Patricia Wald remarked: "No occasion for statutory construction now
exists when the Court will not look at the legislative history." Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195 (1983). Although the frequency of the Court's reliance on legislative history has
declined, nearly all the Justices still generally agree to the utility of legislative history in statutory
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most authoritative aspects of the relevant record committee reports' 6 and
statements by the bill's sponsors. 7
IH. LESSONS OF THE TVPA
An honest appraisal of the TVPA legislative history reveals clear
Congressional support for the consensus position: that Filartiga was
rightly decided and that customary international human rights law is
federal common law. This assessment can be analyzed in three parts.
That is, examining the TVPA text and legislative history establishes: a)
Congress did not intend the TVPA to prevent the litigation of other causes
of action under the ATCA; b) Congress' intent endorsed the Filartiga
doctrine; and c) Congress agreed with the conventional view that
customary international law is federal common law. I discuss each of
these assessments in turn.
A. The TVPA Should Not Limit Other ATCA Causes of Action
A textualist would be hard pressed to prove the TVPA should limit
the scope of the ATCA. Judges have read the ATCA to include a clear
substantive component: a relatively open-ended cause of action for torts
committed in violation of the law of nations. The TVPA provides no
statement, clause, or provision to suggest Congressional disagreement with
the prevailing judicial application of the ATCA. Moreover, a strong
presumption rests against interpreting a subsequent statute to limit the
effect of a prior statute, without a clear Congressional statement to such an
interpretation. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 751 (2d ed. 1995) ("The Supreme Court still relies on
committee reports (even if less than before), and in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991), all of the other Justices joined in a footnote explicitly rejecting Justice
Scalia's general proposition that legislative history is irrelevant to proper statutory
interpretation.").
16. Wald, supra note 15, at 201 ("Committee reports remain the most widely accepted
indicators of Congress' intent."); ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 743 ("Most judges
and scholars agree that committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history
and should be given great weight (i.e., a statement in a committee report will usually count more
than a statement by a single legislator)."); Id. ("Committee reports appear particularly well-
suited for the authoritative role they play. Most legislation is essentially written in committee or
subcommittee, and any collective statement by the members of that subgroup will represent the
best-informed thought about what the proposed legislation is doing.").
17. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 791 ("The qualms courts and commentators
may have about relying on statements made during floor debates and in legislative hearings often
disappear when the speaker is the sponsor of the bill or amendment that includes the statutory
provision being interpreted.").
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effect.'8 Indeed, examining the structure of the statute as a whole now with
the codification of the TVPA at Section 1350 supports the consensus view:
the statute encompasses more than jurisdictional issues. That is, the
ATCA wing like the TVPA wing creates procedural jurisdiction, but also
creates a substantive cause of action. Several federal courts, relying on
their "reading of the plain text of Section 1350," have recognized similar
implications.' 9 Notwithstanding these assessments, at worst, Section 1350
statutory construction is unclear. And, in the event of textual ambiguity,
even a plain meaning rule would permit recourse to legislative history 20
The TVPA legislative history reveals one pervading concern in the
Congressional deliberations: that passage of the TVPA should not disturb
the ongoing development of ATCA litigation. Indeed, the House's
principal sponsor of the TVPA - Representative Gus Yatron - specially
denounced interpreting the TVPA as a narrowing device:
International human rights violators visiting or residing in
the United States have formerly been held liable to money
damages under the Alien Torts Claims Act. It is not the
intent of the Congress to weaken this law, but to strengthen
and clarify it. Federal courts should not allow
Congressional actions with respect to this legislation to
prejudice positive developments, but rather to act upon
existing law when ruling on the cases presently before
them.2 '
18. Id. at 645 (explaining the interpretive rule "that one provision of a statute should not
be interpreted in such a way as to negate or perhaps even derogate from other provisions of the
statute (to the extent that this is possible)").
19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation II, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Our reading of theplain text of §1350 is confirmed by the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, codified at this section.") (emphasis added); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, No. 96-1474 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *54, *55 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1997); Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2nd Cir. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 181, 185
(D.Mass. 1995).
20. Patricia U. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L.REV. 277, 285
(1990).
The Plain Meaning Rule basically articulates a hierarchy of sources from which to divine
legislative intent. Text comes first, and if it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an end.
Legislative history, therefore, still has an important role to play as long as statutory construction
is not entirely plain.
21. The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1417 Before the Subcomm. on
Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1988) (Rep. Yatron). [hereinafter TVPA House Hearings].
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In this regard, members of the House Subcommittee asked all the
witnesses to give assurances that the legislation would endorse, rather than
weaken, other Section 1350 litigation.? In short, the TVPA legislative
history provides little, if anything, to suggest that the Congress thought the
TVPA should be a device for restricting suits; rather, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Congress wanted to leave the
Filartiga doctrine, at the very least, unimpeded.
B. Congress Adopted the TVPA to Endorse the Filartiga Doctrine
The TVPA legislative history provides a surplus of evidence
concerning Congress' endorsement of progressive developments in Section
1350 case law. In particular, the House Report provides language
unequivocally supporting the Filartiga litigation, and emphasizes the
acceptability of the judiciary's prospective incorporation of existing and
evolving customary international law norms: "[C]laims based on torture
or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered by Section 1350. The statute should remain
intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law."23
Correspondingly, the Senate Report reiterates the House Report,
explaining the reason Congress added the TVPA to Section 1350, rather
than replace Section 1350, was to assure the continuation of other causes
of action.'4 Additionally, the Senate Report specifically discusses ATCA
cases involving other causes of action to underscore the view that:
"[T]orture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that
may appropriately be covered by Section 1350."2 Indeed, the Senate's
principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Arlen Specter, explained that the
TVPA was primarily a gap-filling device, meant to safeguard the ongoing
litigation: "This bill closes a gap in the law. Under court decisions, aliens
have the right to sue their torturers under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but
not United States citizens. This bill would extend protection to United
22. TVPA House Hearings, supra note 21, at 71-72 (Rep. Yatron) (asking all panelists to
assure committee that TVPA would not weaken ATCA).
23. H. REP. NO. 367(I), 102D CONG., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 1991
WL 255964 (Nov. 25, 1991).
24. S. REP. No. 249, 102D CONG., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 258662 (Leg. Hist.) at 3 (Nov.
26, 1991) (emphasis added). ("Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be
replaced.").
25. Id at 4;. ("For example, outside of the torture and summary execution context, several
Federal court decisions have relied on Section 1350.") (citing Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp 246 (1985); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md.
1961)).
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States citizens while retaining the current law's protection of aliens. "2
The TVPA was essentially understood as a measure to "eliminate any
uncertainty here and would compliment the ongoing litigation efforts under
the ATCA."27 In sum, Congress wanted to ensure that human rights
litigation would not be bottlenecked by Tel-Oren and passed the TVPA to
ensure the continued success of the Filartiga doctrine.
C. The TVPA Indicates Congress Joins the Consensus View that
Customary International Law is Federal Common Law
Perhaps most debilitating for the revisionist position is the Senate
Report's language strongly supporting the position that customary
international law is appropriately considered federal common law. In no
uncertain terms, the Senate Report endorses this principle, with specific
regard to the elaboration of international law in human rights cases:
While the legislation specifically provides Federal district
courts with jurisdiction over these suits, it does not
preclude state courts from exercising their general
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same type of cases. As a
practical matter, however, state courts are not likely to be
inclined or well-suited to consider these cases.
International human rights cases predictably raise legal
issues such as interpretations of international law that are
matters of Federal common law and within the particular
exFertise of Federal courts.2
The Senate Report dovetails with the House Report's emphasis on
keeping the ATCA "intact to permit suits based on other norms that
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law."29 In short, the Congress, itself, adheres to the maxim
that customary international law is federal common law, especially in
human rights cases.
26. 137 CONG. REC. S1378, 1378 (Jan. 31, 1991) (Statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis
added); see also TVPA House Hearings, supra note 21, at 86-87 (Sen. Solomon) ("[The TVPA]
will serve, in my judgment, to clarify a technical point in the existing law.")
27. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Immigration & Refugee Affairs of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 C., 2 S. 19 (1990) at 40-
41 (emphasis added); see also 135 CONG. REC. H6423, 6426 (Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Leach) (describing TVPA clarificatory function in ensuring progression of ATCA judicial
successes).
28. S. REP., supra note 24, at 6 (emphasis added).
29. H. REP. No. 367(I), 102D CONG., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N., 86 1991 WL
255964 (Nov. 25, 1991).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
After the TVPA, judges who want to respect Congress' intentions
should feel free, if not encouraged, to incorporate human rights violations
in addition to official torture and extrajudicial killing. Indeed, the
revisionist reading of the TVPA requires Herculean judicial activism to
avoid this conclusion. Furthermore, some of the revisionist arguments
concerning the TVPA demonstrate the hollowness of their claims for
democracy. Congress, after all, clearly did not want the TVPA to disturb
the incorporation of other causes of action under the Filartiga doctrine.
Yet, Bradley and Goldsmith would use the TVPA specifically for such
mischief.
At a greater level of abstraction, the TVPA also indicates
Congress' support for the continued judicial practice of applying customary
international human rights law as federal common law. Congress' stance
should confound the revisionist position. The revisionists' instruction to
courts, to incorporate as federal law only customary international law
norms that are designated by statute is a rule that the Congress, itself,
opposes.
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